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Abstract
In this paper, we study the financial and economic implications of a zombie epidemic on a major
industrialized nation. We begin with a consideration of the epidemiological modeling of the zombie
contagion. The emphasis of this work is on the computation of direct and indirect financial conse-
quences of this contagion of the walking dead. A moderate zombie outbreak leaving 1 million people
dead in a major industrialized nation could result in GDP losses of 23.44% over the subsequent year
and a drop in financial market of 29.30%. We conclude by recommending policy actions necessary to
prevent this potential economic collapse.1
Key words: zombie epidemiology; epidemic economics; public policy; financial crisis; price-mediated
contagion
1 Introduction
Ophiocordyceps mortem, colloquially and henceforth named the zombie plague, has proliferated through-
out history with varying strains of the infection. The author considers the first modern outbreak to
have occurred in 1968 during the so-called Night of the Living Dead [22], though written records go
at least as far back as the early 19th century [19]. Since that time, outbreaks of the zombie plague
have occurred with some regularity.
While epidemiologists [21, 1] have studied the spread of the zombie plague through unprepared
populations, the author is not aware of any such study on the financial and economic implications. And
to paraphrase President Harry S. Truman: it’s a zombie recession when zombies eat your neighbors;
it’s a zombie depression when zombies eat you. As such, the goals of this work are to model the
impacts of a new outbreak of the zombie plague on the economic well-being of a major industrialized
nation. Due to the wide-spread panic that may result from the spread of this epidemic, we focus on
∗Stevens Institute of Technology, School of Business, Hoboken, NJ 07030, USA, zfeinste@stevens.edu
1Names, characters, businesses, places, events, locales, and incidents are either the products of the author’s imagination
or used in a fictitious manner. Any resemblance to actual persons, living, dead, or undead, or actual events is purely
coincidental.
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Figure 1: Graphical representation of the SZR model utilized in this work.
financial systemic risk triggered by the freezing of short-term lending markets and margin calls, i.e.,
fire sales and price-mediated contagion as studied in, e.g., [8, 20, 2, 13, 15, 9, 12, 6, 10, 4, 14].
The analysis of this paper is as follows. In Section 2, we construct and calibrate an epidemiological
model of a zombie outbreak. In Section 3, we consider the distribution of financial and economic losses
following an outbreak of the zombie plague. In Section 4, we use these results to construct simple
policy recommendations to mitigate the economic risks associated with the zombie plague. Section 5
concludes. A glossary of symbols utilized in this paper can be found in the appendix.
2 Epidemiological Model
The spread of the zombie plague throughout a population has been a widely studied phenomenon
in epidemiological modeling, see, e.g., [21, 1]. As such, we are able to consider this epidemic using
extensions of the well-known susceptible-zombie-removed [SZR] model. For the purposes of this work,
we consider extensions that include an exposure period before exhibiting symptoms of the zombie
plague, self-isolation of uninfected individuals, and the quarantining and targeted removal of exposed
patients. In this epidemiological framework there are 6 states that a person can be:
(i) an individual is susceptible [S] if they have not been exposed to the zombie plague but are
roaming freely, capable of being infected by the zombified population;
(ii) an individual is isolated [I] if they have sealed themselves off from civilization (possibly in a
small group within an isolated and abandoned mall, as attempted during the 1978 and 2004
flare-ups of the zombie plague [23, 25]) so as to avoid contracting the zombie plague;
(iii) an individual is exposed [E] if they have been bitten or otherwise been contaminated by a
zombified individual;
(iv) an individual is quarantined [Q] if they have been exposed to the zombie plague but confined
to quarters so as to prevent exposing the susceptible population;
(v) an individual is zombified [Z] if they are exhibiting all symptoms of the zombie plague and
roaming freely, capable of infecting the susceptible population;
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(vi) an individual is removed [R] from the system when they are subject to a double tap2,3 and
thus no longer a threat to the general populace.
As summarized in Figure 1, individuals can, and do, transition between states due to isolation,
exposure, quarantining, zombification, and removal at different rates dependent on the sizes of the
populations and speed of progression denoted by the Greek letters. We wish to note that ζQ ≤ ζE as
the exposed but quarantined population will need to both zombify and escape the quarantine zone in
order to be classified as a zombified individual. Mathematically, we define our SZR model as
Isolation Exposure Quarantine Zombified Removal
S˙ = −ιSZ + κI − ǫSZ
I˙ = ιSZ − κI
E˙ = ǫSZ − ωE − ζEE − ρESE
Q˙ = ωE − ζQQ − (ρQS + δ)Q
Z˙ = ζQQ + ζEE − (ρZ(S + I) + δ)Z
R˙ = (ρEE + ρQQ+ ρZZ)S + ρZIZ + δ (Q+ Z)
Briefly, this model encodes dynamics so that susceptible individuals enter isolation at a rate pro-
portional to the susceptible and zombified populations (ιSZ), but leave isolation based either purely
on the boredom of the individuals or the idiocy of a fellow group member attracting zombies to the
hideout (κI). Exposure occurs proportionally to the susceptible and zombified populations based on
chance encounters (ǫSZ); exposed individuals can sacrifice themselves based on the surviving sus-
ceptible population (ρESE), go into quarantine (ωE), or become zombies (ζEE). Those exposed
individuals in quarantine can either escape as zombies (ζQQ), be neutralized by the surviving pop-
ulation (ρQSQ), or decompose through the natural process after death (δQ). Finally, the zombified
population can be be eradicated by the surviving population (ρZSZ) using specialized tools, e.g., the
lobo [7], by the isolated community sniping from rooftops (ρZIZ), or by the natural decomposition
of the human body after death (δZ). Notably, we ignore the risks of an increased death rate from
isolated bands of humans coming into contact with each other (see, e.g., the events during the recent
extended outbreak [11]4).
Though a simpler model than that of [1], we utilize the calibration taken in that model (from
studies of the outbreaks in [22, 26]) in order to determine many of our epidemiological factors. We
adjust these parameters by an order of magnitude to account for more recent outbreaks (see, e.g., [11])
which can seemingly plod along relentlessly rather than the quick outbreaks studied previously in the
2“In those moments when you’re not quite sure if the undead are really dead, dead, don’t get all stingy with your bullets,”
Columbus [17].
3Contrary to popular belief, using plants to shoot zombies is not effective.
4Be wary of those too fond of barbed wire-coated baseball bats named Lucille.
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literature. Specifically, we find
ǫ = 3.60× 10−3/pd
ζE = 1.39/d ζQ = 1.79× 10
−3/d
ρE = 0/pd ρQ = 0.90× 10
−3/pd ρZ = 2.88× 10
−3/pd
δ = 82.24× 10−3/d
with d denoting days and pd denoting person-days. As the latent time for the zombie plague is quite
short (corresponding to a half-life of 12 hours), we set ρE = 0 since, as observed in many prior
outbreaks, susceptible individuals are generally unwilling to eliminate the threat from their soon-
to-be zombified friends. Additionally, we set δ = 82.24 × 10−3/d so as to account for the natural
decomposition process of the human body [24], i.e., if you are zombified at time t = 0 you have a
90% chance of decomposing 28 days later.5 Notably, we leave the isolation (ι, κ) and quarantine (ω)
parameters uncalibrated as these would be in response to policy implemented to encourage good public
health standards and are thus variables for consideration later in this work.
Prior works [21] primarily focus on the epidemiology of the zombie plague have considered the
basic reproduction number R0 of the outbreak and thus consider the likelihood of humanity’s survival.
However, as humanity has continued through a multitude of zombie outbreaks in the modern era
(see, e.g., [22, 23, 25, 26, 7, 17, 11, 18]), we leave such considerations as an exercise to the reader.
We conclude this section with a demonstration of the lethality of the zombie epidemic without any
isolation or quarantining. That is, we set ι = ω = 0 (with κ arbitrary). Notably of the original 330
million citizens of our sample major industrialized nation, every single one would have been infected by
the zombie plague in just over a single month. This occurs even though the human population is able
to contain, but not totally eradicate, the zombified population during this time. The time evolution of
the population is seen in Figure 2a. In contrast, a swift and strong isolation and quarantining policy
ι = ω = 1 (with κ = 0.693 chosen so that the half-life of isolation is only a single day) completely
eradicates the zombie epidemic without requiring significant isolation or quarantining of the populace
as depicted in Figure 2b. Therefore, effective public response to a zombie crisis can not only flatten
the curve, but entirely eliminate the outbreak before it gains a foothold.
3 Economic and Financial Impacts
3.1 First-Order Effects on GDP
Now that we have a model for the propagation of the zombie plague through the population of a
major industrialized nation, we wish to model the impacts these infections have on the economy and
financial system given that a zombie outbreak has begun. First, we will assume that isolated persons
[I] completely drop off the grid in order to avoid the potential zombie horde. As such, they neither
produce nor purchase any goods or services during the period of self-imposed isolation. Second, despite
5Pun intended.
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(a) Time evolution of the population during a zombie
outbreak without isolation or quarantining.
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(b) Time evolution of the population during a zombie
outbreak with strong isolation and quarantining poli-
cies.
Figure 2: Sample epidemiological outputs of the SZR model considered.
limited success getting zombified persons back to work in 2004 [26], we assume all quarantined [Q]
and zombified individuals [Z] drop out of the economy entirely. Finally, and logically, any removed
individuals [R] are now deceased and as such do not contribute to the economy.
The first-order effects of the zombie plague can thus be computed as the lost productivity from
individuals who drop out of the economy. Consider Gross Domestic Product [GDP] of $21.73 trillion
for our major industrialized nation. With a population of 330 million, we find a GDP/capita of
roughly $65,848.48 over a full year. Furthermore, consider baseline consensus of 2% growth in GDP
over the next year; thus the losses are not in absolute terms, but measured against that metric. Over
the following year, the accumulated losses to potential GDP growth is computed as
1
365
∫ 365
0
(I(t) +Q(t) + Z(t) +R(t)) dt× $65, 848.48
where time is measured in days. Of course, this metric is meaningless if the zombie outbreak becomes
a true apocalypse and humanity is wiped out; for instance, in the setting in which no isolation or
quarantining attempts are made there are losses of approximately $19.995 trillion over the first year
after the outbreak; of course there are no humans remaining (and thus no economy) at the end of that
time as depicted in Figure 2a so this is, perhaps, irrelevant in such a scenario.
3.2 Financial Systemic Risk
Provided a sufficient population of humans survive the zombie plague, the first-order effects do not
tell the whole story. An outbreak of the zombie plague is inherently unpredictable. This uncertainty
causes businesses and individuals to postpone major investments, decreasing demand for goods and
services. Additionally, hard-hit geographic areas both from the zombie plague and from policy re-
sponses cause individuals to withdraw from the workforce. This can precipitate cascading effects
because of supply chains; the goods produced by one person or company are the inputs for other
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goods and services in the larger economy. For instance, the definitely-not-evil Umbrella Corporation
manufacturers pharmaceuticals, which requires precise machinery and thousands of chemicals sup-
plied by different companies. If any one of those companies fails to deliver the promised chemical or
component, then the Umbrella Corporation may be forced to suspend production. Such an event may
cause the Umbrella Corporation to withdraw orders from all other suppliers causing cascading losses
to the economy.
Conceptually, the zombie plague does nothing to impact debt obligations (e.g., mortgage or rent
payments as well as bond offerings from corporations) even though both the supply and demand of
goods and services may dry up. Long-term debt is not a concern as the zombie outbreak will either:
decimate society so as to make John Maynard Keynes correct that “in the long run we are all dead;”
or eventually the zombie plague will be defeated and the economy will recover. However, short-term
obligations will still require payments and, furthermore, zombies have a poor record of repaying even
their long-term obligations. If short-term lending markets remain liquid (i.e., willing and able to
provide the necessary funds) then there may only be limited impacts, as the financial system will
functionally transform those short-term debts to longer-term obligations (with some additional in-
terest payments). If the short-term lending markets become illiquid due to uncertainty about future
payments (e.g., financing would not be available to any individual or business that may soon be zomb-
ified), then individuals and companies alike will need to raise cash in other ways. This deleveraging to
reduce debt would be accomplished by selling goods (such as collectibles or financial assets), but, with
a deluge of assets sold at once, the price of each item will drop. Such an event is often called a fire sale;
importantly, when fire sales are triggered by frozen short-term lending markets (rather than, e.g., from
panic associated with the popping of an economic or financial bubble) the typical response of lowering
interest rates will have no effect on the speed and severity of asset liquidations, since the interest
rates only alter the cost at which borrowing occurs. If this causes financial securities (e.g., stocks and
bonds) to fall too quickly (potentially coupled with writedowns on loans to zombified individuals), this
can cause the banks themselves to need to sell the assets (in, e.g., a margin call) they hold which has
a dual impact: (1) the value of the financial markets will plummet in what is called price-mediated
contagion and (2) new (short-term) cash will also become more difficult to obtain further exacerbating
the fire sale. This cyclical deleveraging is one example of, and often called, systemic risk.
If you, the reader, are afraid of mathematical details enriching your brain, thereby attracting
zombies, proceed to Section 4 without any loss of conceptual understanding.
3.3 Modeling Details
With this conceptual understanding, we now wish to investigate the scale of the systemic risk. We
will begin with a consideration of household debts and the impact that the zombie plague may have
on the repayment of those obligations. In the major industrialized nation under consideration, current
outstanding household debt stands at $16.58 trillion, which requires approximately 15.03% of after-tax
income for debt payments (i.e., 15.03% of $68,527 per year per household). Thus the average household
(of 2.52 persons) has $10,299.64 of debt payments per year for a population total of $1.35 trillion.
Thus the writedowns on household debt from zombified, quarantined, and removed individuals T days
after the outbreak began should be
∫ T
0
(Q(t) + Z(t) +R(t)) dt× $1.35×10
12
330×106 + (Q(T ) + Z(T ) +R(T ))×
(
$16.58×1012
330×106 −
$1.35×1012×T
330×106×365
)
.
However, during the outbreak itself, lenders may not have reliable data on who has been zombified
and thus we will assume that these markdowns do not occur until after the zombie plague has been
defeated once more. Additionally, individuals in isolation will lose out on income during their time
of seclusion. To simplify, if short-term lending is available then all individuals take advantage with
minimal cost; without short-term lending available, we assume all lost income is compensated for by
selling assets, i.e., isolated individuals sell a dollar value of
∫ T
0
I(t)dt×
$51, 428
365
from time 0 to T days after the outbreak based on an average after-tax income of $51,428 (i.e.,
approximately 1.33 earners per household). To simplify our setting, we assume that all individuals
hold a diversified portfolio which is liquidated proportional to the holdings and, importantly, have
enough investments to cover these short-term losses.
In addition to the household debts, businesses in our major industrialized nation have obligations
totalling $29.45 trillion. In fact, even companies can catch the zombie plague [3], but to simplify
considerations we ignore the very real threats from zombie firms unable to pay their debts. With
a debt service coverage ratio of 1.35 and yearly operating income of $8.25 trillion results in a debt
payment of $6.11 trillion within the next year. In order to maintain this debt service coverage ratio,
as is typically mandated by lenders (and reducing investments and other expenditures to make up the
short-term debt servicing), the businesses will need to make up for lost profits (of $25,000 per person
per year) by liquidating assets as well. The dollar value of these liquidations up to day T is provided
by
1
1.35
×
[∫ T
0
(I(t) +Q(t) + Z(t) +R(t)) dt× $25, 000
+ (Q(T ) + Z(T ) +R(T ))×
(
$120, 477−
$25, 000× T
365
)]
.
As with households, we assume these businesses sell the market as a whole as necessary.
With these results, we can now consider the impacts of all of these asset liquidations and writedowns
on the financial sector and markets. With a well-functioning repurchase agreement [repo] market, all
banks remain well capitalized in the short term and thus can continue to lend to individuals and
businesses. While some asset liquidations would occur, as shown in [5], there are only minor price
impacts and no major systemic risk event occurs. However, without a functioning repo market, the
banks are themselves unable to obtain short term funding in order to satisfy margin calls on existing
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leveraged agreements which are proportional to the risk-weighted assets at a level 25% above the
regulatory threshold (with θmin = 0.1 and with risk-weights α and price impacts b defined in Table 1).
Specifically, we consider 6 systemically important financial institutions for our major industrialized
nation described and calibrated in [6, 4]. Notably, these banks do not invest solely in the market
portfolio but do so strategically. Under the assumption that banks sell the minimum necessary to
satisfy the margin requirements, and following a proportional liquidation strategy as in [20, 12], the
price-mediated contagion during the zombie outbreak is described as in [14], i.e., the proportion of
asset liquidations Π, asset prices q, value of cash accumulated from liquidations Ψ, and proportion of
liquidations by the non-banking economy η follow the dynamics
Π˙ = −
(
I + Λ(t) diag[−b] diag[q]s⊤
)−1
Λ(t) diag[−b] diag[q]Mη˙
q˙ =
(
I + diag[−b] diag[q]s⊤Λ(t)
)−1
diag[−b] diag[q]Mη˙
Ψ˙ = diag[Π˙]sq
Λ(t) = diag
[
I{θ≤θmin}
]
diag [sAqθmin]
−1
(s− Γ)(I −Aθmin)
η˙ =
1
M⊤q
(
$51, 428
365
× I
+
1
1.35
[
$25, 000×
(
I +
364
365
(Q+ Z +R)
)
+
(
$120, 477−
$25, 000× t
365
)
×
(
Q˙+ Z˙ + R˙
)])
where θi ≤ θmin determines if a bank is subject to a margin call and needs to sell assets at all,
A := diag[α] for notational simplicity, M is the market capitalization for each asset ($30.42 trillion
divided amongst the 16 assets in same proportion to the banking sector as a whole), and s is the
matrix of bank investments. Once the zombie plague has been eradicated, each bank takes stock of
its loan portfolio (ℓ) and marks down any obligations from those that had been zombified. This is
captured by adjusting the loan portfolios downward as computed above and the subsequent fire sale
is modeled as in [4], i.e., q∗ is the final market prices and µ is the vector of writedowns for each bank
q∗ = diag[q(T )] exp(− diag[b]
6∑
i=1
γi)
q¯∗,k =
qk(T )
bk
∑6
i=1 γik
[
1− exp
(
−bk
6∑
i=1
γik
)]
γi =
[(
hi − q
⊤
∗ [I −Aθmin](1 −Πi(T ))si
(q¯∗ − [I −Aθmin]q∗)⊤(1 −Πi(T ))si
)+
∧ 1
]
(1−Πi(T ))si
h = p¯− x−Ψ(T )− diag[1− αℓθmin](ℓ− µ)
µ =
ℓ∑6
i=1 ℓi
[∫ T
0
(Q(t) + Z(t) +R(t)) dt×
$1.35× 1012
330× 106
+(Q(T ) + Z(T ) +R(T ))×
(
$16.58× 1012
330× 106
−
$1.35× 1012 × T
330× 106 × 365
)]
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Asset 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
α 0.07 0.08 0.1 0.12 0.15 0.18 0.2 0.25
b (10−23) 2.20 2.52 3.17 3.83 4.84 5.86 6.56 8.35
Asset 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
α 0.35 0.5 0.6 0.75 1 2.5 4.25 6.5
b (10−23) 12.11 18.28 22.78 30.18 44.55 249.16 1,625.30 15,690.21
Bank BAC C GS JPM MS WFC
αℓ 0.8464 0.8977 0.7222 0.7735 0.7212 0.8503
Table 1: Risk-weights α and market impacts b for the marketable assets and banks.
4 Public Policy and Impacts on Financial Markets
We wish to conclude this study by considering the impacts of different isolation and quarantine strate-
gies on survival and financial markets. As shown in Figure 2, having no isolation or quarantine
strategy leads to the complete annihilation of humanity, whereas a robust isolation and quarantine
strategy can entirely eradicate the zombie plague in a matter of days. Throughout this section we set
κ = 0.0495 so that the median isolated individual goes into hiding for a fortnight. Additionally, as
previous outbreaks have taught us that bitten individuals tend to act extremely selfishly and tend to
ignore their own risks, we consider ι = ω so that exposed individuals enter an isolated quarantine at
the same rate as the susceptible population enters isolation.
The impacts of varying ι = ω on the survival of the human species and on market capitalization of
the full financial market after a single year is displayed in Figure 3. As with some other pandemics [16],
taking multiple simultaneous isolation strategies can greatly reduce the severity and mortality of the
zombie plague, though not eliminate it entirely. Recall that with a population of 330 million, even 1%
mortality of the general populace in our major industrialized nation is 3.3 million deaths. However,
the economy and financial markets are not so forgiving of millions of deaths. For instance, based on
these simulations, a zombie outbreak that kills 1 million people leads to first-order GDP losses (from
baseline growth model of, e.g., 2% growth) of 1.57% and a drop in the full market capitalization of
29.3%; a summary of economic results is provided in Table 2. Recall that these first-order GDP losses
are likely an underestimate as they only consider the lost productivity but no feedback effects. Thus
the best economic and financial solution is to eliminate the zombie threat before it rises from the grave
to threaten the world.
To capture some of the feedback effects on GDP, we consider the market capitalization-to-GDP
ratio. With a long-run average over the past 25 years of 125%, any drop in the market capitalization
can be expected to cause 80% as much damage to GDP; we will call this the regressed GDP estimate.6
With such a regression, the GDP drops 23.44% (in absolute terms) due to a zombie outbreak that
kills 1 million people.
Though obviously the best case scenario is to prevent and contain a zombie apocalypse, herein we
recommend some strategies to mitigate the worst case scenarios from a zombie outbreak. First, and
foremost, listening to experts as to whether to self-isolate or prepare a secure quarantine zombie zone
6Though the pre-outbreak ratio is 1.4, such a ratio tends to drop during market crashes. Due to this we consider the
long-run average rather than the current ratio.
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Figure 3: Impacts of public health policy on survival, GDP, and financial markets.
ι = ω 0.500 0.322 0.293 0.274 0.266
Deaths (Millions) 0.016 1.000 2.280 3.300 3.787
First-Order GDP Losses (%) 0.04 1.57 3.28 4.48 5.00
Regressed GDP Losses (%) 0.94 23.44 40.00 49.03 52.53
Market Cap Losses (%) 1.18 29.30 50.00 61.29 65.66
Table 2: Summary of health, economic, and financial impacts of the zombie plague over 1 year for select
public health strategies.
is vitally important. As demonstrated in Figure 2b, a strong policy of isolation and quarantine can
eliminate a zombie outbreak in days with few deaths; as demonstrated in Figure 3, the quickest way to
rescue the financial markets is to prevent the zombie epidemic from spreading. However, the resources
to implement such a robust strategy are immense; for example, the closing of shopping malls and bars
(such as the Monroeville Mall and Winchester Tavern) is costly. Thus it is, perhaps, overly optimistic
to believe such a strategy will be undertaken early against an outbreak of the zombie plague.
Therefore, with the above considerations of cost of allowing the zombified population to grow,
the government and central bank of our major industrialized nation should guarantee that short-term
lending markets remain active to prevent a run on the shadow banking system. A rescue of the
repo market, along with incentives for debt restructuring for impacted individuals and businesses to
avoid the vast majority of zombie-based defaults, would eliminate the greatest harms to the financial
markets. As such, in opportunity costs, this rescue strategy could pay for itself many times over.
5 Conclusion
We modeled the state of the financial markets of a major industrialized nation from an outbreak of
the zombie plague. In order to accomplish such a feat, we consider the epidemiological modeling of the
zombie plague through the population and then model how such contagion spreads to and through
the financial system. This modeling allowed us to consider how different public health policies on
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isolation and quarantining the population can mitigate the zombie plague on both the population and
financial markets; in our nation of 330 million people, a loss of 1 million people to the zombie plague
can cause GDP losses of 23.44% and a market drop of 29.30%. The costs of ignoring the economics
and financial impacts of the zombie plague can be apocalyptic, so following these mitigation strategies
is paramount. And remember, if you do not use your brain during a zombie outbreak, you may start
craving someone else’s.
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Glossary of Symbols
α Vector of risk-weights for the financial assets
αℓ Vector of risk-weights for bank loans
γ Vector of bank liquidations due to writedowns in loans following the zombie outbreak
δ Rate that zombies decompose
ǫ Rate that susceptible individuals are bitten by zombies
ζE Rate that exposed individuals turn into zombies
ζQ Rate that quarantined zombies escape from their confinement
η Total market liquidations by non-financial sector during the zombie outbreak
θmin Margin requirement for banks
ι Rate that susceptible individuals go into isolation
κ Rate that isolated individuals leave their hiding places due to boredom or being found
ρE Rate that susceptible individuals eliminate the threat from their bitten friend
ρQ Rate that susceptible individuals find and neutralize quarantined zombies
ρZ Rate that susceptible individuals successfully double tap zombies
µ Vector of bank losses to their loans due to writedowns due to the zombie outbreak
ω Rate that exposed individuals quarantine themselves before becoming a zombie
Λ Financial contagion matrix
Π Vector of proportions of bank trading book liquidated during the zombie outbreak
Ψ Vector of cash raised by banks due to liquidations during the zombie outbreak
b Vector of market impact parameters for each asset
h Vector of bank shortfalls following the zombie outbreak
ℓ Vector of loan portfolios for banks
p¯ Vector of liabilities for banks
q Vector of asset prices during the zombie outbreak
q∗ Vector of asset prices following bank liquidations following the zombie outbreak
q¯∗ Vector of asset prices obtained by banks when liquidating following the zombie outbreak
s Matrix of bank asset holdings
x Vector of cash available to the banks
A Diagonal matrix of risk-weights α
E Number of individuals exposed to the zombie plague
I Number of individuals practicing self-isolation
M Vector of asset market capitalizations
Q Number of bitten individuals in quarantine from the general populace
R Number of individuals removed from the system so they are no longer a threat
S Number of individuals susceptible to the zombie plague
Z Number of zombies
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